Franco-Turkish Rivalry in Libya: Between Historic Influence and New Strategy

Franco-Turkish Rivalry in Libya: Between Historic Influence and New Strategy

North Africa has always been an open arena for the struggle for influence between regional and international powers. However, over the past decade, the Franco-Turkish rivalry has emerged as one of the most prominent and complex manifestations of this conflict. While France considers the region an extension of its historical influence and traditional sphere of influence, Turkey seeks to return to it through new means that combine active diplomacy, economics, and defense coordination. This has created a delicate balance, particularly in Libya.

 

France sees itself as the natural heir to a long-standing colonial legacy stretching from Algeria to Chad, Mali, and Niger, and considers any rival presence in this region a threat to its strategic influence. Turkey, for its part, has found in the vacuum left by Paris due to its declining military and political presence in the Sahel and Libya an opportunity to return to the African stage, leveraging both historical and geographical factors. The old Ottoman ties and Turkey’s position as a Mediterranean power have formed the basis of a new political discourse for Ankara, one built on “restoring historical ties” and establishing equitable partnerships instead of traditional hegemony.

 

Libya represents the point where the interests and contradictions of both sides converge. With the intensification of the Libyan civil war after 2014, both Ankara and Paris saw an opportunity to reposition themselves in the region.

 

Turkey sided with the internationally recognized government in Tripoli, signing security, maritime, and economic agreements that enabled it to establish a strong presence in the west of the country.

 

In contrast, France supported factions in the east and south, viewing them as potential allies to counterbalance Turkey’s growing influence.

 

This rivalry was not limited to the military sphere; it extended to political and economic issues, from reconstruction to gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. It also impacted positions within the European Union and NATO, where France found itself in indirect confrontation with a fellow member of the alliance, adding a complex dimension to relations between the two sides.

 

 

 

 

 

The Broader Regional Dimension

 

The French-Turkish conflict extends beyond Libya, encompassing North Africa and the Sahel, Paris seeks to maintain its military presence in the Sahel through its former Operation Barkhane and new counterterrorism initiatives, while Ankara is forging ties with Niger, Chad, and Sudan, leveraging soft power tools such as humanitarian aid, education, and investment.

 

In this sense, France is attempting to defend its traditional legacy, while Turkey is building a modern influence based on economic and diplomatic penetration rather than direct control.

 

The most evident consequence of this competition is the difficulty in unifying the international position on the Libyan issue.

 

Whenever Libyan parties approach an agreement, external disagreements resurface, pushing back the progress.

 

French support for factions in the east is perceived by Tripoli as political bias, while Paris views the Turkish presence in the west as a threat to the Mediterranean’s stability. This contradiction has transformed Libya into an arena for conflicting interests, rather than a platform for consensus among international partners.

 

However, this competition could have a positive side if properly managed. The presence of multiple external actors might push Libya to adopt a balanced and open policy that safeguards its interests without becoming beholden to any single party, the greater the number of actors involved, the more room for maneuver Libyan diplomacy will have to rearrange its priorities.

 

What Libya needs today is to transform this competition into a positive bargaining chip rather than a burden. It can benefit from Turkish technology and investments in infrastructure and energy, while simultaneously drawing on European – specifically French expertise in education and security cooperation, Libya can also serve as a bridge between Paris and Ankara on certain issues, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa.

 

For this to happen, Libyan foreign policy must be unified, based on the principles of positive neutrality and balanced openness, not on alignment with any particular side, the more unified the Libyan domestic position, the less likely the country will be exploited as an arena for settling regional scores.

 

It is also important to view the French-Turkish rivalry within a broader context that includes the reshaping of the Mediterranean as an energy sphere of influence and maritime connectivity. Turkey is attempting to assert its presence through a maritime border agreement with Libya, while France is working to support alliances opposed to it in the Eastern Mediterranean. This maritime conflict extends its impact to gas and trade routes, making Libya a vital center for any future settlement.

 

Ultimately, the French-Turkish rivalry is not a zero-sum game, but rather an attempt by each side to establish a foothold in a rapidly changing environment. Libya is at the heart of this transformation, and if it manages its relations well, it has the potential to transform from an arena of influence into an influential player in the region’s balance of power.

 

History and geography grant it the ability to play a mediating role between Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, provided that its foreign policy is based on flexibility, pragmatism, and a dispassionate assessment of interests, rather than one driven by the passions of conflict.

 

In an era where interests intersect but do not clash, those who fail to manage the competition around them become mere pawns in the calculations of others. But those who understand the nature of the game can turn it into a lever of influence and dominance.

 

 

 

The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the editorial position of this publication.