An Analysis of the US Administration’s Approach to North Africa
With every presidential transition in Washington, foreign policy priorities are revisited under the banner of ‘reassessment’. Geography, however, does not change. North Africa, strategically positioned between the Mediterranean and the Sahel-Sahara belt, is a crossroads linking European security, energy markets, migration routes and global competition.
In that context, even when the region does not feature prominently in US election campaigns, it returns attention whenever developments intersect with core American or allied interests. What distinguishes the current administration is not a dramatic strategic shift, but a reaffirmation of a pattern that has guided successive governments: engagement without overextension, influence without ownership.
Across party lines, Washington approaches North Africa through three principal lenses: stability, energy, and competition. The difference today lies in how carefully these priorities are calibrated.
Regional Stability
The first lens is stability. Washington views North Africa as closely tied to the security of Southern Europe and the broader Mediterranean. Instability in Libya, Tunisia, or the Sahel inevitably affects European partners.
American policy reflects this interconnected view. The administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy emphasized working with partners to prevent state collapse and reduce transnational threats. It states clearly that the United States will “support partners as they strengthen stability and resilience to prevent regions from becoming sources of instability.” In Libya, successive US officials have repeatedly stated that there is no military solution to the conflict and have endorsed the efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya as the primary political framework.
This preference is not accidental. It reflects an assessment shaped by Iraq and Afghanistan: stabilization is preferable to transformation. The US supports negotiated settlements, electoral roadmaps, and institutional continuity, yet avoids assuming the burdens of enforcement. In the Sahel, cooperation has centered on security partnerships and intelligence coordination rather than expansive deployments. The objective is containment of risk rather than ambitious redesign.
Energy Security
Energy forms the second dimension. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dramatically reshaped European energy priorities, and North Africa’s relevance rose accordingly. In this context, Algeria and Libya are seen as important contributors to European energy security — which, in turn, affects American strategic interests.
The US Embassy in Tripoli has publicly urged that oil fields remain operational and that revenues flow through unified sovereign institutions. Successive US administrations have therefore supported the stability of the region’s energy sectors, promoted transparency in resource management, and sought to prevent energy from being used as political leverage by unstable actors.
Geopolitical Competition
The third lens is strategic competition. North Africa is no longer a peripheral theater. External actors have entrenched themselves across the region.
Russia has expanded security influence in eastern Libya through Wagner linked elements. China has deepened infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative. Turkey formalized military and maritime agreements with Tripoli based authorities in 2019. European states remain deeply engaged, particularly in migration and energy.
Washington understands that full disengagement would leave space for rival powers to entrench themselves. At the same time, there is little appetite for costly military or political intervention. The result is what might be described as “calibrated engagement”: active diplomacy, limited security cooperation, and selective economic support — while expecting regional actors to assume primary responsibility.
Libya illustrates this approach vividly. Washington prioritizes three objectives: preserving unified economic institutions, sustaining oil production away from armed conflict, and preventing hostile entrenchment.
Rather than aligning decisively with any domestic faction, the US has maintained relative distance, engaging multiple actors while anchoring its policy within the UN framework. This reflects recognition of Libya’s fluid power balance. Open favoritism could quickly become strategic liability.
When oil has been weaponized for political leverage, Washington has tended to respond quickly, not out of charity, but because prolonged shutdowns threaten both Libya’s cohesion and wider energy stability. During the January 2020 closures, the US Embassy warned that the halt risked worsening the humanitarian situation and insisted that “NOC operations should resume immediately.”
This regional connection renders any piecemeal approach less effective and necessitates consideration of cross border cooperation frameworks, whether in combating criminal networks or in regional development projects. For the countries of the region, this situation demands a pragmatic approach. The United States will not act as a substitute for local actors, but it is prepared to support initiatives that demonstrate a genuine commitment to reform and institution building. The more coherent a national vision emerges, the greater the chances of attracting sustained American attention, however, amidst division and polarization, American policy tends toward crisis management and risk mitigation, rather than investing in profound transformations that may lack guarantees of success.
In conclusion, the new US administration’s approach to North Africa can be characterized by three main features, pragmatism driven by interests, caution that avoids costly adventures, and selectivity in choosing partnerships and priority issues.
The ideas and concepts expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of Libya Economic Review. If you would like to contribute to LER, contact us at younis@libyaeconomicreview.com.
