South of Crete, North of Libya: Energy Is Turning Maritime Claims into a Three-Way Contest
Libya’s warning over Greek hydrocarbon exploration south of Crete shows that the Eastern Mediterranean dispute is no longer simply a quarrel between Ankara and Athens. As offshore investment expands, Türkiye, Libya and Greece face growing pressure to resolve competing maritime claims.
The latest dispute over the waters south of Crete did not begin in Ankara. It came from Tripoli.
Libya has warned Greece that continuing hydrocarbon exploration in areas where the two countries have yet to agree on a maritime boundary could jeopardize bilateral negotiations and potentially lead to their suspension. The warning appeared in a diplomatic note sent to Athens on August 24, but its details became public in October as US energy major Chevron prepared for exploration activity south of Crete. Libya’s warning over Greek exploration south of Crete.
Greece rejected the Libyan position, arguing that the note repeated established claims and that maritime negotiations remained under way.
The dispute reflects a broader change in the Eastern Mediterranean. For years, maritime tensions were largely presented as a Turkish-Greek rivalry, with Libya entering the picture through its 2019 maritime agreement with Ankara. That description is no longer sufficient. Libya is increasingly advancing its own maritime claims while expanding offshore energy cooperation with Türkiye and maintaining separate boundary discussions with Greece.
Energy is turning competing claims on a map into commercial and diplomatic decisions.
Why Greece and Libya Disagree Over the Waters South of Crete
Greece accelerated its offshore ambitions in February 2026 when it signed exploration agreements with a consortium led by Chevron and HELLENiQ Energy covering four offshore areas, including South Crete 1 and South Crete 2. Chevron holds a 70% operating stake, with HELLENiQ Energy holding the remaining 30%. Athens presented the agreements as a major expansion of its exploration programme, almost doubling the maritime area under exploration. The Greek government’s February 2026 agreements with Chevron and HELLENiQ Energy.
For Greece, the exploration program supports its energy security ambitions and could help establish whether the deep waters south of Crete contain commercially viable gas. For Libya, however, the same blocks raise an unresolved question over maritime boundaries and access to offshore resources.
In a report submitted to the United Nations in 2025, Libya’s National Oil Corporation argued that more than 85% of the combined South Crete 1 and South Crete 2 acreage falls south of the maritime boundary claimed by Tripoli. This represents Libya’s position, not an internationally agreed boundary, and Greece rejects it. Nevertheless, the submission formally places Libya’s objection before the UN. Libya’s submission to the United Nations on the Greek exploration blocks.
The disagreement centers on continental shelf rights, which give countries rights to explore and extract resources from the seabed and its subsoil. Exclusive economic zones also cover economic activities in the surrounding waters. Greece and Libya have yet to agree on where their respective maritime zones meet.
Greece argues that it can use the median-line principle in the absence of an agreed boundary. It also maintains that Crete, as a large and inhabited island, generates its own maritime entitlements under international law. Türkiye takes a different position, arguing that islands should not automatically receive full effect when countries determine maritime boundaries, particularly in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.
Türkiye is not a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while Libya signed the convention in 1984 but has not ratified it. These differences underpin the competing legal positions.
At the centre of the wider dispute is the 2019 Türkiye-Libya maritime memorandum. Signed on November 27, 2019, the agreement established a maritime boundary between the two countries across part of the Eastern Mediterranean. It later entered into force and was registered with the United Nations. Registration records the agreement but does not resolve the competing claims surrounding it. The registered 2019 Türkiye-Libya maritime memorandum.
Greece rejects the agreement because it considers the maritime line to disregard the rights of Greek islands, particularly Crete.
Offshore Investment Raises the Stakes
The dispute is becoming more complicated because governments are no longer discussing maritime boundaries in isolation. They are awarding exploration rights, attracting international energy companies and preparing offshore investment program.
Türkiye’s state energy company, TPAO, is becoming an increasingly important part of Libya’s offshore sector. In February 2026, Libya awarded exploration rights for Offshore Area 07 to a consortium involving TPAO, Spain’s Repsol and Hungary’s MOL. TPAO holds a 40% stake, alongside Repsol with 40% and MOL with 20%. The block covers more than 10,300 square kilometres. MOL’s announcement on the Offshore Area 07 agreement.
The block does not physically overlap with the Greek-licensed exploration areas south of Crete. That distinction matters. However, the wider strategic picture is significant. As Chevron prepares to explore Greek offshore acreage, a Turkish state company is securing a direct commercial role in Libya’s offshore energy industry.
The relationship goes beyond the licensing round. In June 2025, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed a memorandum of understanding with TPAO covering geological and geophysical studies in four offshore areas. The two companies also discussed a 10,000-kilometre two-dimensional seismic survey to assess potential resources. The NOC’s agreement with TPAO.
These developments give Ankara a stronger commercial presence in Libya while creating new opportunities for the country’s offshore exploration program.
They also add another dimension to the maritime dispute. Energy companies cannot determine national boundaries, and exploration licenses do not settle competing sovereignty claims. However, governments and companies that commit money to offshore projects have a greater interest in protecting their commercial positions.
Can Energy Investment Complicate Maritime Negotiations?
Greece faces a difficult balance. Athens is challenging the legal basis of the Türkiye-Libya maritime agreement while negotiating a maritime boundary with Libya itself. Since 2025, Greek officials have maintained contact with both Tripoli and Benghazi, and technical discussions on delimitation have resumed. In June 2026, Greek officials confirmed that talks with Tripoli were under way while authorities in eastern Libya remained informed. Greek Foreign Ministry briefing on maritime negotiations with Libya.
However, offshore exploration could make those negotiations more difficult.
Athens argues that an unresolved maritime boundary should not prevent Greece from exercising what it considers its sovereign rights. From Tripoli’s perspective, allowing seismic surveys and eventually drilling in disputed waters before reaching an agreement could weaken Libya’s negotiating position.
Ankara has its own strategic interests. Every Libyan objection to Greek exploration strengthens Türkiye’s argument that maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean should account for its interpretation of island rights. At the same time, Türkiye has a growing commercial stake in Libya’s energy sector and an interest in maintaining access to offshore opportunities.
This creates a three-way dynamic in which each country has something to gain and something to lose. Greece wants to expand exploration and protect its maritime claims. Libya wants to defend its offshore interests while attracting investment. Türkiye wants to maintain its strategic partnership with Tripoli and expand the role of its energy companies.
The implications extend beyond the three governments. Chevron, TPAO, Repsol, MOL and Libya’s NOC are now part of a dispute that could influence future exploration decisions, investment commitments and regional energy cooperation.
The next phase of the Eastern Mediterranean dispute may therefore look different from the confrontations of the past. The central challenge is no longer limited to whether Athens accepts the 2019 Türkiye-Libya agreement. It is whether Greece, Libya and Türkiye can manage their competing maritime claims without disrupting a new generation of offshore energy projects.
South of Crete and north of Libya, that test has already begun.
